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Abstract
We explore patterns of competitive interaction by studying mixed-strategy equi-
librium pricing in oligopoly settings where consumers vary in the set of suppliers
they consider for their purchase. In the case of nested reachwe nd equilibria,
unlike those in existing models, in which price competition is segmented: small rms
o¤er only low prices and large rms only o¤er high prices. We characterize equilib-
ria in the three-rm case using correlation measures of competition between pairs of
rms. We then contrast them with equilibria in the parallel model with capacity con-
straints. A theme of the analysis is how patterns of consumer consideration matter
for competitive outcomes.
1 Introduction
In settings where consumers vary in the set of suppliers they consider for their purchase,
how do outcomes depend on the patterns of competitive interactions? The simplest sit-
uation in which this question arises is a duopoly in which each rm has some captive
customers, while non-captive customers are able to choose whichever rms o¤er they like
better. With more than two rms, richer patterns of consideration become possible. Some
consumers may be captive to particular rms, some might consider the o¤ers of all rms,
while others can choose among the o¤ers of various subsets of rms. Competitive out-
comes, including patterns of price dispersion, then depend not only on the number and
rms and their relative sizes, but also upon the pattern of consumer consideration of rms.
The main aim of this paper is to explore this issue in an otherwise standard setting where
rms compete in prices using mixed strategies.
Both authors at Department of Economics and All Souls College, University of Oxford. We are
grateful to Massimo De Francesco, Daisuke Hirata, Maarten Janssen, Jon Levin, Domenico Menicucci,
Vlad Nora, Martin Obradovits, David Ronayne, Neri Salvadori, Robert Somogyi, and Jidong Zhou for
helpful comments.
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There are various reasons why di¤erent consumers have di¤erent sets of choices open
to them. Perhaps following a prior stage of advertising by rms or search by consumers,
some might become aware of a di¤erent set of suppliers than do other consumers. For
instance, Honka et al. (2017, Table 1) document di¤erent levels of consumer awareness of
various retail banks in a local market. Alternatively, as in Spiegler (2006), there might
be horizontal product di¤erentiation such that each consumer considers only a subset of
products to be suitable. The set of rms who are currently active in the market might be
uncertain (Janssen and Rasmusen (2002)) or the set of rms who choose to post prices on a
comparison website might be uncertain (Baye and Morgan (2001)). Some consumers might
be constrained in their choices by location, transport costs or switching costs. For instance,
some models of spatial competition, such as Smith (2004), suppose that a consumer con-
siders buying from those rms located within a specied radius of her. Consumers might
also di¤er in their ability to make comparisons between o¤ers, with confused consumers
choosing randomly between suppliers or buying from a default seller (Piccione and Spiegler
(2012), Chioveanu and Zhou (2013)). Our analysis does not take a view on the underlying
reason why consumers have di¤erent consideration sets. Rather, it takes the distribution
of consideration sets in the consumer population as given, and explores the consequences
for competition.
A considerable literature has explored aspects of this question, and some settings are
well understood the case with symmetric sellers considered randomly, the case of inde-
pendent reach, and duopoly. (These special cases are discussed in more detail in section
2.) As to the rst of these, Rosenthal (1980) and Varian (1980) considered the situation in
which some consumers are randomly captive to particular rms, while others compare the
o¤erings of all rms and buy from the cheapest. There is a symmetric equilibrium with
price dispersion, in which all rms choose prices according to the same mixed strategy.
Burdett and Judd (1983, section 3.3) analyze a more general symmetric model, in which
arbitrary fractions of consumers consider one random rm, two random rms, and so on.
Provided some consumers consider just one rm and some consider more than one, the
symmetric equilibrium involves price dispersion, and industry prot is proportional to the
number of captive consumers who consider just one rm.
With independent reach, studied by Ireland (1993) and McAfee (1994), the fact that
a consumer considers one rm does not a¤ect the probability she considers any other
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rm.1 Then the rm that reaches the most consumers also has the largest proportion
of captive consumers among the consumers within its reach i.e., the highest captive-to-
reach ratio. In equilibrium all rms use the same minimum price, but the maximum price
charged is lower for smaller rms. Since rms use the same minimum price, their prots
are proportional to their reach. The same is true in duopoly, as analyzed by Narasimhan
(1988).2 In these situations with symmetry, independent reach or duopoly, rms compete
head-to-head in price, in the sense that there is a range of prices chosen by all rms.
The aim of the present paper is to take further the analysis of asymmetric cases. In
doing so, we discover equilibria with quite di¤erent characteristics from those in the litera-
ture.3 In section 3 we consider nested reach, in which only the largest rm has any captive
customers, and we nd equilibria with an overlapping duopolyproperty if the increments
between successive rm sizes are non-decreasing. There is an increasing sequence of prices
fpkg such that the range of prices that the kth smallest rm might charge is an interval
[pk 1; pk+1]. Hence small rms charge low prices while large rms charge high prices, so
that price competition is segmented instead of head-to-head.
The paper goes on in section 4 to provides a general analysis of the three-rm case. Even
with triopoly, a wide variety of patterns of competitive interactions is possible. We dene
a measure of the competitive interaction between a pair of rms, which reects correlation
between consideration of the two rms. When competitive interactions between pairs of
rms are similar, as with independent reach, we show that all rms use a common lowest
price and hence have prot proportional to their reach. In some of these cases, however,
we nd that the price support of the least competitive rm might not be an interval the
rm might price high and low but not in an intermediate range. By contrast, when one
pair of rms is signicantly more competitive than other pairs, the equilibrium has the
1Manzini and Mariotti (2014) study a choice model where an agent is aware of a particular option with
specied independent probability. In an empirical study of the personal computer market, Sovinsky Goeree
(2008) assumes that the reach of the various products is independent.
2With duopoly or independent reach, the largest rm chooses the maximum price with positive probabil-
ity, which could be interpreted as its regularprice. In Armstrong and Vickers (2019) we use Narasimhans
duopoly framework to investigate the impact of rms being able to o¤er di¤erent deals to captive and con-
tested customers.
3An important early exception is the asymmetric model is Baye, Kovenock and De Vries (1992, Section
V), where consumers either consider a single rm or all rms, but rms have di¤erent numbers of captive
customers. They show that all but the two smallest rms choose the monopoly price for sure, while the two
smallest rms compete using mixed strategies as in the Narasimhan duopoly model. This is an extreme
case of the situation where large rms choose only high prices, which we discuss further at several points
in the analysis to follow.
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overlapping duopoly property one rm prices low, one high, and one across the full
price range. Intuitively, this pair mostly compete with each other, leaving the remaining
rm with an incentive to set high prices. When the market changes so that one pair
of rms has greater competitive interaction e.g., if additional consumers consider both
rms this can induce the remaining rm to retreat to its captive base. The triopoly
case also allows analysis of the e¤ects of entry. While entry pushes down prices in some
cases, there are natural patterns of competitive interaction where, counter-intuitively, the
opposite happens and consumers are harmed by entry.
Another setting in which rms have limited reach and use mixed pricing strategies is
when they have capacity constraints, as in the classic Bertrand-Edgeworth model see,
for example, Vives (1999, section 5.2) for an overview.4 For comparison with our main
model with consideration sets, section 5 presents the solution to the triopoly version of
that model in a simplied setting with unit demand. The closest papers to our analysis are
Hirata (2009) and De Francesco and Salvadori (2015), who show how a small rm might
be unwilling to price as low as larger rms, and hence obtains a higher prot per unit
of capacity than its larger rivals. We solve this capacity model using a similar method
as we use in the consideration set model, although the analysis is considerably simplied
since there is a clear-cut ordering of rms by capacity. In contrast to the consideration set
model, segmented price competition is not possible in the capacity model, nor is it possible
for entry by a third rm to harm consumers.
We conclude in section 6 by summarizing our main insights, and suggesting avenues for
further research on this topic.
2 A model with consideration sets
There are n rms that costlessly supply a homogeneous product. There is a population of
consumers of total measure normalized to 1, each of whom has unit demand and is willing
to pay up to 1 for a unit of the product.5 Consumers di¤er according to which rms they
consider for their purchase, and for each subset S  f1; :::; ng of rms (including the null
4Montez and Schutz (2019) study a duopoly model where both capacity constraints and heterogenous
consideration sets play a role.
5The positive analysis which follows is not a¤ected if each consumer has a downward-sloping demand
function x(p), provided revenue px(p) is an increasing function up to the monopoly price. However, welfare
analysis (for instance in our discussion of entry) requires adjustment with downward-sloping demand.
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set) suppose that the fraction of consumers who consider exactly the subset S is S. (We
slightly abuse notation, and write 1 for the fraction who consider only rm 1, 12 = 21
for the fraction who consider only rms 1 and 2, and so on.) When there are only few
rms the pattern of consideration sets can be illustrated using a Venn diagram, and Figure
1 depicts the market with three rms.6 Here, a consumer considers a particular subset of
rms if she lies inside the circleof each of those rms. For instance, a fraction 12 of
consumers consider the two rms 1 and 2.
Figure 1: Consideration sets with three rms
A consumer is captive to rm i if she considers i but no other other rm, and there is
a fraction i of such consumers. The reach of rm i is the set of consumers who consider
the rm, and the fraction of such consumers is denoted i, so that
i =
X
Sji2S
S :
Finally, the captive-to-reach ratio of rm i is denoted i, where
i =
i
i
:
Firms compete in a one-shot Bertrand manner, and a consumer buys from the rm she
considers which has the lowest price (provided this price is no greater than 1). If two or
6In a spatial context this Venn diagram has a more literal interpretation: if consumers only consider
buying from a rm within a specied distance, then the locations of rms determine the centre of the circles
on the diagram. With more rms (and a nite set of consumers), consideration sets can be conveniently
depicted using a bipartite graph, where the two groups in the graph are the consumers and the rms, and
a line connecting a consumer to a rm corresponds to the former considering the latter. In a very di¤erent
context, Prat (2018) uses a model of consideration sets similar to that presented here.
5
more rms choose the same lowest price, suppose the consumer is equally likely to buy
from any such rm. Since industry prot is a continuous function of the vector of prices
chosen, Theorem 5 in Dasgupta and Maskin (1986) shows that an equilibrium exists. Since
an individual rms prot is usually discontinuous in the price vector, the equilibrium will
usually involve mixed strategies for some rms. It is useful to rule out some extreme and
uninteresting congurations. The rst assumption requires that there be some competitive
interaction between sellers:
Assumption 1: Some consumers consider at least two rms.
(If all customers were captive, each rm chooses p  1 for sure.) The second assumption
prohibits the possibility that a subset of rms choose the competitive price p  0 for sure,
as such rms play no important role in the analysis:
Assumption 2: Every non-empty subset of rms S contains at least one rm with con-
sumers within its reach who consider no other rm in S.
For instance, this assumption rules out the situation where two rms reach precisely the
same set of consumers. Intuitively, Assumption 2 ensures that no subset S of rms will
set p  0, since there is a rm in S which has some customers with no overlap with other
rms in S, and this rm can protably raise its price above zero. These two assumptions
together imply that there is no equilibrium in pure strategies, and at least some rms
choose their price according to a mixed strategy.
When rm i chooses price p  1 it will sell to a consumer when that consumer is within
its reach and when none of the other rms the consumer considers o¤ers a lower price.
Therefore, when rival rms j 6= i choose price according to the cumulative distribution
function (CDF) Fj(p), rm is expected demand with price p  1 is
qi(p) 
X
Sji2S
S
0@Y
j2S=i
(1  Fj(p))
1A : (1)
Here, the sum takes place over all consumer segments which consider rm i, and for each
such segment the product takes place over all rivals for rm i in that segment. (If there
are no such rivals, i.e., when the segment comprises rm is captive customers, we use the
convention that this product equals 1.7) Equilibrium occurs when each rm i obtains prot
7Expression (1) is written without taking into account the possibility of ties; however, Lemma 1 shows
that ties do not occur with positive probability.
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i, chooses price according to the CDF Fi(p), and rm is prot pqi(p) is equal to i for
every price in rm is support and no higher than i for any price outside its support.8
The following result collects a number of observations about the nature of equilibrium,
some of which are familiar from the existing literature.9
Lemma 1 In any equilibrium:
(i) rm i obtains prot i  i, with equality for at least one rm, and the minimum price
in its support is no smaller than i;
(ii) each rm obtains positive prot (even if it has no captive customers) and p0, the
minimum price chosen by any rm, is positive;
(iii) each rms price distribution is continuous (that is, has no atoms) in the half-open
interval [p0; 1);
(iv) each price in the interval [p0; 1] lies in the price support of at least two rms;
(v) if there are three or more rms, there is at least one price which lies in the support of
three or more rms, and
(vi) p0 lies weakly between the second lowest i and the highest i. If the rm with the
highest i has p0 in its support then p0 is equal to the highest i.
Proof. This and subsequent proofs are contained in the appendix.
Various changes to the market can naturally be studied within this framework of con-
sideration sets. For instance, entry by a new rm can be modelled as a new circle
superimposed onto the existing Venn diagram. That is, entry does not a¤ect which con-
sumers consider the incumbent rms, and the reach of an incumbent rm is una¤ected by
entry, although its number of captive customers will weakly fall.10 Since welfare (consumer
surplus plus industry prot) is the total number of consumers reached, it follows that entry
(if it is costless) will weakly increase welfare. Likewise, if entry reduces industry prot it
will benet consumers. Relatedly, an increase in a rms reach is modelled as an expansion
of its circle, so that a larger subset of consumers consider it, while the consumers who
8As usual, the support of rm is price distribution is dened to be the smallest closed set P  [0; 1]
such that the probability that the rm chooses a price in P equals one.
9For instance, see McAfee (1994, page 28).
10In particular, there is no danger of choice overload, whereby the number of consumers who compare
prices falls when there are more rms, as discussed for instance in Spiegler (2011, page 150).
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consider the other rms is unchanged. Mergers also have a natural set-theoretic interpre-
tation in this framework: when two or more rms merge we assume that the merged entity
sets the same price to all its customers, and that the set of consumers who consider the
merged entity is the union of the sets of consumers who considered the separate rms.11
Thus, a merger (if there are no accompanying cost synergies) has no impact on welfare,
and harms consumers if and only if it increases industry prot. Note that the fraction of
consumers reached by the merged rm is no greater than the sum of those reached by the
separate rms, while the captive base of the merged rm is no lower than the sum of cap-
tives of the separate rms. Finally, a market expansion can be modelled as an increase in
the fractions of consumers in each segment of the Venn diagram (taken from the consumer
segment who previously considered no rm at all).
As discussed in the introduction, previous work has studied the special cases of duopoly,
symmetry arising from random consideration, and independent reach, and we describe
those cases here for later reference.
Duopoly: Lemma 1 determines the unique equilibrium when there are two rms, the sit-
uation studied by Narasimhan (1988). Suppose rms are labelled so 2  1 (which with
duopoly implies 2  1 and 2  1). Then both rms have the same support for prices,
[p0; 1], where p0 = 2, and rm i has prot i = i2. Note that the smaller rms prot
weakly exceeds its captive prot 1. The larger rms prot necessarily increases when
its reach increases, as its prot is equal to its fraction of captive customers, which weakly
increases. However, the smaller rms prot could fall when its reach increases, for instance
if its own captive base does not change but it expands su¢ ciently into the rivals captive
base to become the larger rm.
Industry prot in equilibrium is
 = (1 + 2)2 = 1 + 2   12   12
1
2
: (2)
One can check that industry prot increases with each fraction in the Venn diagram (i.e.,
with 1, 2 and 12), so that any form of market expansion boosts industry prot. Total
welfare is the total number of consumers reached,W = 1+2 12, and consumer surplus
11An alternative approach would be for the merged entity to maintain separate brands and to charge
distinct prices for each brand.
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is therefore
CS = W    = 121
2
:
Thus, keeping reaches constant, consumer surplus increases when the overlap 12 is larger,
even though fewer consumers are then served. Likewise, consumer surplus decreases when
the larger rms set of captive customers expands, keeping the other regions of the Venn
diagram unchanged, even though more consumers are served. A merger from duopoly to
monopoly is always protable, and so harms consumers.
Symmetric rms: Burdett and Judd (1983, section 3.3) study a market with n  2 sym-
metric rms and where consumers consider rms at random (a specied fraction consider
one random rm, a specied fraction consider two random rms, and so on). This model
can be generalised so that rms are symmetric but consideration sets need not be random.
Specically, suppose that each rm has a1 captive customers, a2 consumers who consider
exactly one other rm (not necessarily random), and in general am consumers who consider
m  1 other rms for m  n. Let
(x)  a1 + a2x+ a3x2 + :::+ anxn 1
be the probability generating function associated with the number of rivals faced by a rm.
Here, (x) is convex and increasing, the number of captive customers for each rm is (0),
each rm has reach is  = (1) and captive-to-reach ratio  = (0)=(1). Assumptions 1
and 2 entail 0 < (0) < (1).
In a symmetric market, the unique symmetric equilibrium (which is not necessarily the
only equilibrium) is derived as follows. Each rm obtains equilibrium prot i  (0) and
has the minimum price . When each of its rivals uses the CDF F (p), a rms demand with
price p  1 in (1) is q(p) = (1  F (p)). Since each rm makes prot (0), the symmetric
equilibrium CDF satises
(1  F (p))  (0)
p
; (3)
and the function F (p) strictly increases from 0 to 1 as p increases from  to 1.
The models in Rosenthal (1980) and Varian (1980) are a special case of this framework,
where consumers either consider one random rm or consider all rms, so that am = 0
for 1 < m < n. With this all-or-nothingpattern of consideration, Baye et al. (1992)
show that when n  3 there are multiple equilibria (all of which involve the same prot
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for rms). For instance, all but two rms might choose p = 1 for sure, selling only to their
captive customers, while the remaining two rms choose prices on the interval [; 1].
In general, entry by a new rm into a symmetric market has ambiguous e¤ects on
industry prot and consumer surplus, as we discuss in more detail in section 4. However,
a merger between two or more rms in a symmetric market is always protable. Before
merger each rm obtained prot equal to its captive base, and a merger can only increase
the merged entitys number of captive customers. A merger cannot decrease the prot
of the non-merging rms (since they still obtain at least their captive prot), and so the
merger increases industry prot and harms consumers.
Independent reach: Ireland (1993) and McAfee (1994) study the situation where each
rm has an independent chance of being considered by a consumer. Specically, rm i
is considered by an independent fraction i of the consumer population, where rms are
labelled so that 1  2  :::  n  1. The fraction of consumers who are captive to
rm i is i = ij 6=i(1  j) and so this rms captive-to-reach ratio is i = j 6=i(1  j).
Thus, as with duopoly, the rm with the largest reach is also the rm with the highest
captive-to-reach ratio.
If rm j chooses its price with the CDF Fj(p), rm i sells to a consumer if it reaches
that consumer (which occurs with probability i) and no rival reaches that consumer with
a lower price. The probability that rm j does reach the consumer with a lower price
is jFj(p). Therefore, rm is demand with price p  1 in (1) takes the multiplicatively
separable form
qi(p) = i
Y
j 6=i
(1  jFj(p)) : (4)
Ireland (1993) and McAfee (1994) show that the equilibrium is such that all rms have
the same minimum price p0, which from Lemma 1(vi) is equal to n = 
n 1
j=1 (1  j), and
the prot of rm i is i = ip0. (In particular, unless it is the largest rm, a rms prot
decreases with its reach i when i  1=2.) Thus, rmsprots are proportional to their
reaches, the prot of the largest rm is equal to its number of captive consumers, while
the prot of smaller rms is weakly greater than their number of captive consumers. The
CDFs which support these equilibrium prots are such that rm i chooses its price with
interval support [p0; pi], where rm is maximum price pi is smaller for smaller rms. The
two largest rms choose prices with support [p0; 1], so that the maximum prices satisfy
10
p1  p2  :::  pn 1 = pn = 1. Thus price supports are nested, so that smaller rms only
o¤er low prices while the largest rms o¤er the full range of prices.12
With independent reach, industry prot is
 =

nP
i=1
i

p0 =

nP
i=1
i
 n 1Y
i=1
(1  i) : (5)
Total welfare is the fraction of consumers who consider at least one rm, which is 1  
ni=1(1  i), and the di¤erence between welfare and prot is consumer surplus
CS = 1 

1 +
n 1P
i=1
i
 n 1Y
i=1
(1  i) : (6)
Expression (6) can be interpreted as an index of the competitivenessof the market in
this context. Consumer surplus does not depend on the reach of the largest rm, n, but
increases with the reach of each smaller rm.
One can verify that entry by a new rm, also with independent reach, will necessarily
increase consumer surplus in (6). If two rms i and j merge, the merged entity has
independent reach i + j   ij. If the merged entity is not the largest rm in the post-
merger market, the minimum price p0 is una¤ected by the merger, and since the reach of
the merged entity is below the sum of the individual reaches, it follows that the merger
is unprotable for the two rms. A merger which is protable, therefore, has the merged
entity being the largest rm in the market. One can check that this implies that the
minimum price p0 rises with the merger, in which case the non-merging rms also increase
their prot after the merger. Therefore, with independent reach a protable merger must
increase industry prot, and hence reduce consumer surplus.
In each of these special cases of duopoly, symmetry and independence, the format of
the equilibrium is similar: each rm chooses its price from an interval, all rms have the
same minimum price p0, and as a result a rms prot is proportional to its reach. All
rms compete head-to-headin prices, in the sense that there is a range of prices that all
rms choose. In the remainder of the paper we show that other possibilities exist outside
these special cases. We start in the next section by describing a radically di¤erent kind of
equilibrium that can occur when rms have nested reach.
12This equilibrium was subsequently shown by Szech (2011) to be unique.
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3 Nested reach
The situation with independent reach has all consumers being equally likely to be reached
by a rm, regardless of which other rms they consider. At the other extreme one could
envisage consideration sets as being nested, in the sense that if rm i reaches a greater
fraction of consumers than rm j, all rm js consumers also consider rm i. For example,
an entrants reach lies inside an incumbents reach if only a subset of latters existing
customers are willing to consider buying from the entrant. Likewise, if consumers consider
options in an ordered fashion, as may be the case with internet search results (where
some consumers just consider the rst result, others consider the rst two, and so on),
then the reach of a lower ranked option is nested inside that of a higher ranked option.
Alternatively, if consumers only consider the rms whose product they nd suits their
tastes, then low-quality rms could supply a product which is found suitable by only a
subset of the consumers who like the product of a higher-quality rm. With nested reach
only the largest rm has any captive customers, and a smaller rm has positive demand
only if its price is below all the prices of larger rms.
Figure 2: Three rms with nested reach
As depicted in Figure 2, suppose there are n  3 rms with nested reach, let rm i have
reach i, where rms are ordered as 1 < 2 < ::: < n, and for i  2 write i = i   i 1
for the incremental reach of rm i. While it is hard to nd the equilibrium in all nested
situations, the following result describes equilibrium in those cases where incremental reach
is larger for larger rms. (This is the case, for instance, if there is a constant rate of attrition
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in consideration, so that the fraction of consumers who consider rm k is k = 
n k for
some  < 1.)
Proposition 1 Suppose n  3 rms have nested reach such that
0 < 2  :::  n : (7)
Then there is an equilibrium with price thresholds p1 < p2 < ::: < pn 1 < pn = 1 such that
the price support of rm 1 is [p1; p2], the support of rm n is [pn 1; pn], and the support of
rm 1 < i < n is [pi 1; pi+1]. Thus, only rms i and i+ 1 (where 1  i < n) choose prices
in the interval (pi; pi+1). The thresholds are determined recursively by p2 =
1+2
2
p1 and
for 1 < i < n
pi+1 = pi +
i
i+1
pi 1 ; (8)
where p1 is chosen to make pn = 1. The prot of rm 1 is 1 = 1p1 and the prot of rm
i > 1 is i = ipi.
The format of this equilibrium consists of overlapping duopolies, where each price is
in the support of exactly two rms,13 and where smaller rms only choose low prices while
larger rms only choose high prices.14 In this sense there is segmented price competition
rather than head-to-head price competition, even though there is head-to-head competition
in terms of consumer consideration (as rm 1s potential customers consider all rms).
Nevertheless, the presence of large rms a¤ects the prots of smaller rms, and (except
for the very largest rm) vice versa. To illustrate, suppose that 1 = 2 = ::: = n  
so that reach is equally spaced. Then expression (8) implies that pi+1 = pi + pi 1, so that
pi = p1'i where 'i is the ith number in the Fibonacci sequence (as given by 1, 2, 3, 5, 8,
13,...). Since pn = 1, it follows that the lowest price is p1 = 1='n, in which case pi = 'i='n
and the prot of rm i is i = 'i='n.
Proposition 1 describes equilibrium only for cases where incremental reach weakly in-
creases. In the next section we specialise the framework to triopoly, and there we will
13With the exception of the threshold prices p2; :::; pn 1, which are in the support of three rms.
14A similar pattern of segmented pricing is seen in Bulow and Levin (2006). They study a matching
model where n heterogeneous rms each wish to hire a single worker from a pool with n heterogeneous
workers, where the payo¤ from a match is (in the simplest version of their model) the product of qualities
of the rm and worker. Firms choose wages which they must pay regardless of the quality of the worker
eventually hired, workers care only about their wage, and higher quality workers choose their employer
rst. In equilibrium, rms o¤er wages according to mixed strategies, where higher quality rms o¤er wages
in a higher range than lower quality rms.
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obtain results that imply for the case of nested reach that (i) when 2 > 1 the equilib-
rium in Proposition 1 is unique and (ii) when 2 < 1 the equilibrium instead has all three
rms using the same minimum price p0. However, in the latter case we will see that the
largest rm can sometimes have a gap in its price support, so that it uses high and low
prices but not intermediate prices.
4 The three-rm problem
In the cases considered so far (duopoly, independent reach, and nested reach) there is a
clear-cut ordering of the rms, in the sense that a rm with a larger reach also has a weakly
higher captive-to-reach ratio. However, more generally those two ways to order rms need
not always coincide. For instance, a niche rm could have limited reach but have a
high proportion of its reach being captive. In this section we allow for general patterns of
competitive interaction in the context of triopoly.
Consider the triopoly market shown on Figure 1. For each pair of rms i and j dene
ij =
ij + 
ij
;
where to simplify notation we have written  = 123. The parameter ij reects correlation
in the reach of rms i and j: i and j are the respective probabilities that a consumer
considers rm i and rm j while (ij + ) is the probability she considers both rms, and
so ij is above or below 1 according to whether consideration of rm i is positively or
negative correlated with consideration of rm j. With independent reach we have ij = 1,
while if the reach of rms i and j is disjoint then ij = 0. The pair of rms with the largest
ij can be thought of having the most competitive interaction in the market, and the
remaining rm can be considered to be the least competitive rm. As we will see, if only
two rms choose the lowest price p0 in equilibrium, while the third rm only uses higher
prices, they will be the rms with the largest ij.
Similarly, write
 =

123
;
which is again equal to 1 with independent reach. Note that k  ij for distinct i, j
and k, with equality if and only if ij = 0. For simplicity, if Fi(p) is rm is CDF for
price in equilibrium write Gi(p)  iFi(p), so that Gi increases from zero to i. Using this
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notation, rm is demand at price p in (1) is
qi = iFjFk + i(1  Fj)(1  Fk) + (i + ij)(1  Fj)Fk + (i + ik)Fj(1  Fk)
= i + FjFk   ( + ij)Fj   ( + ik)Fk (9)
= i[1 + GjGk   ijGj   ikGk] : (10)
Our main result in this section shows that the form of equilibrium depends on whether or
not the competitive interactions between rms, measured by ij, are similar or asymmetric.
Proposition 2 Suppose that rms are labelled so that rms 2 and 3 are the most compet-
itive pair of rms, i.e., 23  maxf12; 13g.
(i) If
minf2; 3g < 12 + 13   23 (11)
then in equilibrium all rms have the same minimum price p0, which is the highest captive-
to-reach ratio among the rms;
(ii) If
minf2; 3g > 12 + 13   23 (12)
then equilibrium takes the form of overlapping duopoly. In particular, if rms 2 and 3
are labelled so 3  2, then there are prices p0 and p1, with p0 < p1  1, such that rm
3 has price support [p0; p1], rm 2 has support [p0; 1] and rm 1 has support [p1; 1]. (If
2 = 3 then p1 = 1 and rm 1 chooses p  1 for sure.) Explicit expressions for the
thresholds p0 and p1, as well as for the prots of the three rms, are given in the proof.
This result shows that only limited kinds of pricing patterns can emerge in equilibrium.
For example, it cannot be that two rms choose prices over a range [p0; 1] while the third
rm only chooses from an intermediate or upper range of prices.
Clearly, part (i) of this result applies when the competitive interactions are similar
across pairs of rms (and where some consumers consider exactly two rms so that k <
ij), as is the case with independent reach. Indeed, part (i) applies if the two most
competitive pairs are approximately equally competitive: if say 23 = 13  12 and there
are some consumers who consider exactly two rms then condition (11) is satised. In
particular, if in the statement of Proposition 2 there is a tiefor which pair of rms is the
most competitive, then part (i) must apply. With nested reach the two smallest rms are
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the most competitive pair and condition (11) requires that incremental reach is smaller for
larger rms. Thus with three rms, the cases not covered by Proposition 1 have all rms
using the same minimum price.
Part (ii) applies when one pair of rms has signicantly more competitive interaction
than other pairs. For instance, if rms 2 and 3 are considered by almost the same set
of consumers (so their circles on the Venn diagram almost coincide), and if 1 > 0, then
rms 2 and 3 are the most competitive pair and condition (12) is satised, and the least
competitive rm 1 chooses price p  1. Intuitively, when two rms reach nearly the same
set of consumers, they compete ercely between themselves, leaving the remaining rm to
price at or near the monopoly level. Likewise, if rm 1 has a large captive base so that
1 is large (and when rms 2 and 3 have some overlap), then rms 2 and 3 are the most
competitive pair and condition (12) is satised. With nested reach, condition (12) requires
that incremental reach is larger for larger rms, thus verifying Proposition 1. Another
situation where (12) holds is the specication in Baye et al. (1992, Section V), where no
consumer considers exactly two rms and 1 > 2  3, in which case ij = =(ij) and
the two smaller rms 2 and 3 are the most competitive pair. Yet another conguration
where part (ii) applies is when two rms have disjoint reach, so that 13 =  = 0 say, in
which case (12) holds whenever 12 6= 23.
In the knife-edge case where
minf2; 3g = 12 + 13   23 ; (13)
which is not covered by Proposition 2, there is the possibility that both kinds of equilibrium
coexist. For instance, this is so in the symmetric Varian-type market where 12 = 13 =
23 = 0 and 1 = 2 = 3, where there is a symmetric equilibrium where all rms price
low and also asymmetric equilibria where one of the rms chooses p  1. (See Baye et
al. (1992) for the full range of equilibria in this market.) Another example with multiple
equilibria is when two rms have disjoint reach and each lies inside the reach of the third
rm, where again (13) is satised.15
15Inderst (2002, section 3) presents a model where two symmetric rms each have reach which lies
inside that of a larger rm. This conguration could fall into either part (i) or part (ii) of Proposition 2,
depending on the extent of overlap between the smaller rms. The paper does not derive the equilibrium,
but argues that the expected price chosen by the large rm is lower when there is overlap between entrants
compared to when the entrantsreach is disjoint.
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The impact of entry: As an application of this analysis, consider the impact of entry by
a third rm E into a duopoly market with incumbents A and B. One immediate point is
that the external impact of entry on consumers and incumbents cannot be positive. The
impact on total welfare is the extra consumer segment reached by the entrant, which is the
entrants captive base E. However, the entrants equilibrium prot must be at least E,
and so the sum of incumbent prot and consumer surplus must weakly fall. As a corollary
to this, if entry does not induce a fall in the market minimum price, p0, then consumers
must be harmed by entry. If p0 does not fall then neither does an incumbents prot (since
it could choose price equal to the new p0 to obtain prot ip0, but may do better than
this, and ip0 is no lower than its prot before entry), and hence consumer surplus must
weakly fall with entry.
In many situations, entry will induce the minimum price to fall. Consider for example a
symmetric market where n rms each reach an independent fraction  of consumers. Then
(3) implies that each rm chooses price with CDF F satisfying
1  F (p)
1  
n 1
=
1
p
:
This CDF increases with n, so the presence of one more rm causes each incumbent to
reduce its price in the sense of rst-order stochastic dominance. Such a change must benet
all consumers, including those who remain captive to incumbents after entry.
Other patterns of entry could be less balanced, however, and might induce an in-
cumbent to retreatto its captive base by raising its price, thereby harming its captive
customers. To illustrate, consider an extreme case where the entrants reach coincides
exactly with the reach of one of the incumbents (a situation which does not satisfy As-
sumption 2). Then these rms will set p  0, while the other incumbent chooses p  1 and
fully exploits its captive customers. Nevertheless, since entry of this form reduces industry
prot, consumers in aggregate will benet.
Finally, consider entry which does not induce a fall in the minimum price, and therefore
harms consumers in aggregate. One situation where this happens is when incumbents are
symmetric and the entrant is considered only by those consumers who already consider
both incumbents, as illustrated on Figure 3. This pattern of consideration is reasonable
if only savvyconsumers consider buying from the entrant, and these are the consumers
who are already willing to consider both incumbents. In this case part (i) of Proposition
2 applies to the post-entry market (provided the entrants reach lies strictly inside the
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incumbents overlap). The minimum price is equal to an incumbents captive-to-reach
ratio, which is unchanged with entry. Thus, entry of this form harms consumers. In fact,
it is perfectly possible that even the consumers who consider all three rms are harmed
by this form of entry, despite being able to choose among more rms, as the higher prices
o¤ered by incumbents leave the entrant relatively free to set high prices too.
Figure 3: Entry into the contested market
This result is related to Rosenthal (1980), where entry by a new rm causes the average
price paid by both captive and informed consumers to rise. However, in his model the
entrant arrives with its own new pool of captive customers, thus raising welfare, whereas
the e¤ect arises in our scenario despite the entrant having none.16
The impact of market expansion and of mergers: Another useful comparative statics exer-
cise is to consider the impact of a market expansion. An old intuition is that an increase in
the number of comparison shoppers consumers who compare prices from several rms
induce rms to lower their prices, which benets all consumers including captives. This is
true in a duopoly setting or in the all-or-nothingconsideration pattern in a Varian-type
model, but is less clear more generally. In particular, if the competitive interaction between
16Relatedly, in a setting with di¤erentiated products, Chen and Riordan (2008) show how entry to a
monopoly market can induce the incumbent to raise its price. For instance, entry by generic pharmaceuti-
cals might cause a branded incumbent to raise its price, as it prefers to focus on those captive customers
who care particularly about its brand. Closer to the consideration set framework is Chen and Riordan
(2007), who study a model with symmetric rms, where consumers either consider a single random rm or
consider a random pair of rms. Among other results, they show that the equilibrium price can increase
when an additional rm enters.
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one pair of rm increases disproportionately, this could give a third rm an incentive to
raise its price, thereby harming its captive customers. To illustrate, starting from a sym-
metric triopoly market, if we increase 23 then part (ii) of Proposition 2 will eventually
apply, in which case rm 1 will focus on exploiting its captive base and choose p  1.
Thus, increased competition between two rms can harm the captives of a third rm.17
Consider next the impact of a market expansion on industry prot. With duopoly, we
have seen that an increase in any or all of the three parameters 1, 2 and 12 must increase
industry prot (although it might reduce one rms prot). With duopoly, increasing the
size of the overlap region 12 will intensify competition (in the sense that the minimum price
p0 is reduced), but this is outweighed by impact on each rms reach so that (1+2)p0 rises.
With triopoly, by contrast, increasing the fractions in some regions of the Venn diagram
can intensify competition to an extent that outweighs the market expansion e¤ect, so that
industry prot falls. To see this, consider a triopoly market where part (i) of Proposition
2 applies, in which case industry prot is
 = (1 + 2 + 3)p0 ; (14)
where p0 is the highest captive-to-reach ratio. If rm 1 has the highest captive-to-reach
ratio, then a small increase in that rms overlap regions 12, 13 or  will keep the form of
the equilibrium unchanged, but the minimum price p0 will fall. Firm 1s prot is unchanged
(since it obtains its captive prot regardless), and one can calculate that the impact on
industry prot (14) of a small increase in 12 or 13 is negative if 1 < 2 + 3, while a
small increase in  reduces prot if 21 < 2 + 3.
Such situations can be adapted to show how a merger which prots the merging parties
might lower industry prot, and hence benet consumers. Suppose three rms, 1, 2 and 3,
serve a population of consumers, and that rm 1 obtains exactly its captive prot. Suppose
as above that adding a set of consumers C to this market, all of whom lie inside rm 1s
reach, reduces industry prot. (However, rm 1s prot cannot fall with this change, since
it obtained its captive prot before, and its number of captives does not fall.) Next, in this
expanded population suppose there are two further rms, 4 and 5, which (departing from
17A similar e¤ect can occur when the fraction of consumers who consider all three rms rises. For
instance, suppose consumers segments are (proportional to) 1 = 3 and 2 = 3 = 12 = 13 = 23 = 1,
then for any  rms 2 and 3 are the most competitive pair, and for small  part (i) of the proposition
applies, while if  is increased part (ii) eventually applies in which case rm 1 chooses p  1. Here, a
increase in  a¤ects the interaction between rms 2 and 3 disproportionately, and tilts the market towards
segmented pricing.
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Assumption 2) both reach exactly this set C of consumers. Since these two rms reach the
same consumers, they will charge p  0 for sure, and for rms 1, 2 and 3 the market is as
if the C consumers were absent. Now consider a merger between the three rms 1, 4 and
5. The e¤ect of this merger on industry prot is the same as the e¤ect of introducing the
C consumers into the original three-rm situation, which is negative by assumption. Thus
the merger is benecial for consumers. It is also protable for the merging parties because
rm 1 made its captive prot before the merger while rms 4 and 5 made zero prot. This
example shows that not all protable mergers in our setting are detrimental to consumers.
But such mergers appear to be relatively rare. For instance, consider a triopoly market
where part (i) of Proposition 2 applies. As with our discussion of mergers with independent
reach in section 2, for a merger between two of the rms to be protable, the minimum
price p0 must rise after the merger, and this benets the non-merging rm too. Such a
merger will therefore harm consumers.
Equilibrium strategies when all rms use the same minimum price: Proposition 2 provided
much information about equilibria in this model it characterises equilibrium prot and
consumer surplus in the two regimes, and it describes equilibrium strategies when part
(ii) applies. However, it does not describe equilibrium strategies for part (i), and the
equilibrium patterns of prices turn out to have interesting economic properties.
In the earlier version of this paper (Armstrong and Vickers, 2018, Proposition 2) we
calculated an equilibrium whenever part (i) applied (without showing if it was unique),
and this took one of two forms: either (a) the three rms were active in a lower price range
and then two were active in range of higher prices, or (b) the three rms were active in
a lower price range, then only the most competitive pair were active in an intermediate
price range, and then another pair of rms were active in a higher range. In particular,
in situation (b) the least competitive rm used low and high prices, but not intermediate
prices.
The general analysis was complicated, and the main insights can be obtained more
transparently in the simpler case with nested reach, as presented in this result.
Proposition 3 Suppose three rms have nested reach, where rm 1 has reach 1, rm 2
has reach 2 = 1 + 2, and rm 3 has reach 3 = 2 + 3.
(i) If 3=2  1 then rm 1 has support [p0; p1], rm 2 has support [p0; 1] and rm 3 has
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support [p1; 1], where
p0 =
23
23 + 
2
2
and
p1 =
23
23 + 
2
2
>
1
2
: (15)
(ii) If 2=2 < 3=2 < 1 then rm 1 has support [3; p1], rm 2 has support [3; 1] and
rm 3 has support [3; p^] [ [p1; 1], where 3 = 3=3 is the highest captive-to-reach ratio
and
p^ = 1  p1 = 
2
2
23 + 
2
2
<
1
2
: (16)
(iii) If 3=2  2=2 then rm 1 has support [3; p1] and rms 2 and 3 have support
[3; 1].
The case of three nested rms can therefore exhibit three distinct patterns of price
competition, depending on the relative sizes of demand increments. If the largest rms
captive portion is relatively small, rms compete head-to-head as in the case with inde-
pendent reach i.e., all price low and two price high. If the largest rms captive portion
is relatively large, it only prices high and we have overlapping duopoly pricing. In between
are equilibria in which the largest rm prices low and high but not in a mid range.
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Figure 4: Ironingin nested market with 1 = 1=2, 2 = 4=5, 3 = 1
The reason why the largest rm has non-convex price support can be explained as
follows. When all rms price low in equilibrium, so that part (i) of Proposition 2 applies,
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one can calculate that the three CDFs increase in p for prices just above p0, the minimum
price. (This is ensured by condition (11).) One can also calculate the smallest price, p1
say, at which some CDF reaches 1 and above which the two remaining rms compete as
duopolists for prices up to 1. (In the nested case, it is the smallest rms CDF which rst
reaches 1, although in the general model more detailed analysis is required to determine
which rm rst drops out.)
However, in some cases in the nested case those covered by part (ii) of Proposition
3 the least competitive rms candidate CDF (i.e., when we ignore the monotonicity
constraint on the CDF) starts to decrease in p before the largest CDF reaches 1, which
cannot therefore be a valid CDF. Figure 4 illustrates an example with nested reach where
1 = 1=2, 2 = 4=5 and 3 = 1, and the solid curve depicts the largest rms candidate
CDF if we ignored its monotonicity constraint. The correct CDF for the largest rm is
then obtained by ironingthis curve as shown on the gure, so that the largest rm does
not choose prices in the interval denoted by the dashed line, which from (15)(16) is the
interval (9=25; 16=25) in this example. This procedure is valid as long as the decreasing
candidate CDF does not become negative before the largest CDF reaches 1, and this is
ensured by the condition 2 > 3 in Proposition 3 (or more generally by condition (11)
in Proposition 2). As 3=2 ! 1, this gap in the least competitive rms support widens,
until eventually this rm does not compete using low prices at all.
The equilibria with ironing when one rms price support has a gap in the middle
provide insight into the relationship between the two parts of Proposition 2. As the nested
example in Proposition 3 illustrates, as parameters move from satisfying (11) towards
satisfying (12), an equilibrium with ironing emerges, and the lower element of the price
support of the rm in question shrinks until it disappears, leaving an equilibrium of the
overlapping duopoly form.
5 A model with capacity constraints
As discussed in the introduction, another circumstance in which rms have limited reach is
when they have capacity constraints, as in the Bertrand-Edgeworth model of competition.
A natural question is how equilibria in this scenario compare with equilibria in our main
model with consideration sets. To address this question in the most direct way we assume
there are three rms and that consumers have unit demands and homogenous valuations
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(which avoids the need to posit a particular rationing rule). As we explain, for some
congurations of capacities (and always when there are just two rms), equilibria in the
Bertrand-Edgeworth model resemble those that arise in the model with consideration sets.
But for other congurations they are quite unlike any such equilibria.
Suppose there is a continuum population of identical consumers of measure 1 who
each consider all prices and are willing to pay 1 for a unit of homogeneous product. Firm
i = 1; 2; 3 can costlessly supply any quantity up to its capacity i but cannot supply beyond
this. A consumer tries to buy at the lowest available price, but is not always able to do
so: once the capacity of the cheapest rm is exhausted, remaining consumers then try to
buy from the second cheapest rm, and then any remaining consumers buy from the third
rm.
We make the following assumptions about capacities:
0 < 3  2  1 < 1 ; (17)
  1 + 2 + 3   1 > 0 ; (18)
2 + 3 < 1 : (19)
Condition (17) reects our labelling convention in this section, and has the substantive
assumption that no rm can supply all consumer demand on its own.18 Here, i is rm is
supply when it o¤ers a price below both its rivals, and corresponds to reachin our main
model. In (18)  is the excess of total capacity over demand, and unless it is positive there
is no competition between rms and the equilibrium price for each rm is p  1. Firm is
supply if it o¤ers a higher price than both its rivals is 1 j k if this is positive, and this
represents the rms captive customers. (Since  > 0, a rm is not capacity constrained
when undercut by both rivals, and can only supply its residual demand 1 j k, if any.)
Firm i has captive customers if and only if i > , and (19) ensures that the largest rm
has captive customers (otherwise equilibrium involves all rms choosing the price p  0).
It is convenient to focus on a rms contestedcustomers, dened to be its capacity
minus is captive customers, and for rm i denote this by
i = i  maxf1  j   k; 0g = minfi; g :
18The situation where one rm has capacity to serve all demand is analyzed as Case 1 in Hirata (2009),
who shows there is an indeterminacy in the equilibrium price distributions for the smaller rms.
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Note that 3  2  1 = . Firm is captive-to-reach ratio is 1   i=i, so that
3  2  1, and unlike the consideration set framework here rms are necessarily or-
dered so that rms with large reach have a large captive-to-reach ratio. Dasgupta and
Maskin (1986) ensures existence of equilibrium in this Bertrand-Edgeworth market, while
our earlier Lemma 1 continues to apply.
Figure 5: Interpreting the capacity model in terms of consideration sets
When its rivals use CDFs Fj and Fk to choose their prices, rm is expected sales with
price p  1 is
qi = FjFk(i   i) + (1  Fj)(1  Fk)i
+(1  Fj)Fk minfi; 1  kg+ Fj(1  Fk) minfi; 1  jg :
For instance, if rm j undercuts rm i and rm k does not, rm i can supply the residual
demand 1  j or its capacity i, whichever is the smaller. Noting that
minfi; 1  jg = i   + minf; 1  j   (i   )g = i   + k ;
we can rewrite this expression for qi as
qi = i + [2  1   2   3]FjFk   [  j]Fj   [  k]Fk :
Comparing this expression to (9) shows that this market is equivalent to a market with
consideration sets where rm i has i  i captive customers, [i + j   ] customers who
also consider rm j, [i+k ] customers who also consider rm k, and [2 1 2 3]
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customers who consider both rivals. Noting that 1 =  and that 1   1 = 1   2   3,
this demand system can be depicted as the Venn diagram shown on Figure 5, where the
weights in the segments sum to total demand 1.
Here, the term 2+3  is strictly positive.19 Therefore, the consumer segment which
considersall three rms has negative weight   2   3 < 0, and this crucial di¤erence
with the consideration set model can a¤ect the structure of equilibrium. In particular, with
three rms the capacity model is never isomorphic to a model with consideration sets.
As with expression (10), rm is demand can be written succinctly as
qi(p) = i[1 + ^GjGk   ^ijGj   ^ikGk] ; (20)
where Gj(p)  jFj(p), and
^12 =
  3
12
; ^13 =
  2
13
; ^23 = 0 and ^ =
  2   3
123
: (21)
Here, ^12  ^13  ^23 = 0. Therefore, using the terminology from section 4, it is the
two largest rms which have the greatest competitive interaction. The following result is
analogous to Proposition 2, and characterizes when it is an equilibrium for all rms to
price low.
Proposition 4 (i) If ^12 = ^13 then in equilibrium all rms have the same minimum price
p0 = (1  2   3)=1, which is the captive-to-reach ratio of the largest rm.
(ii) If ^12 > ^13 then in equilibrium only the two largest rms o¤er the lowest price p0,
which again is the captive-to-reach ratio of the largest rm.
There are just two ways to achieve the condition ^12 = ^13. Either ^12 = ^13 = 0, in
which case all three rms have captive customers.20 Alternatively, ^12 = ^13 > 0, when
neither rm 2 or 3 has captive customers, which requires 2 = 3 so that the two smaller
rms are exactly the same size. Therefore, if rm 3 has no captive customers and is strictly
smaller than rm 2, part (ii) of the proposition applies.
Part (ii) does not characterize the smallest rms prot or the equilibrium strategies.
However, in the earlier version of this paper (Armstrong and Vickers, 2018, Proposition 3)
19Since i = minfi; g, the only way the term could be negative is if both 2 and 3 were below , in
which case 2 + 3    = 2 + 3   , which is positive since 1 < 1.
20It is straightforward to extend this result that when even the smallest rm has captive customers
the equilibrium has all rms pricing low to an arbitrary number of rms.
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we calculated an equilibrium (for which we did not show uniqueness) whenever part (ii)
applied. In that equilibrium the two largest rms have price support in the whole range
[p0; 1], while the smallest rm chooses it price from a strictly interior interval [p0; p00], where
p0 < p
0 < p00 < 1. Thus the smallest rm obtains strictly greater prot per unit of capacity
than its larger rivals. This pattern of pricing is not possible in the main model with con-
sideration sets, where the only possibilities were for all rms to price low or for there to be
overlapping duopoly. Conversely, one can show that the overlapping duopoly pattern is not
possible in this capacity model.21 Thus the segmented price competition sometimes seen in
the consideration sets framework does not appear with Bertrand-Edgeworth competition.22
Another contrast with the main model is that here it is not possible that entry into
a duopoly market can harm consumers. To see this, consider two incumbents, A and B,
with respective capacities A and B  A. If A + B  1 then there is no competition
between these rms, consumers have zero surplus, and entry can only improve consumer
surplus. Suppose then that A + B > 1, so that the incumbents cover the market, in
which case industry prot without entry (as in expression (2) above) is
(A + B)
1  B
A
:
Suppose a third rm enters, with capacity E. Since demand was already met, entry
leaves welfare unchanged and consumers are harmed if and only if industry prot rises.
If E  1   B then no rm has any captive customers after entry, equilibrium price is
p  0 and consumers benet from entry. Otherwise, if E < 1   B rm A has captive
demand but rm E does not. In the knife-edge case where E = B, part (i) applies, and
a direct calculation shows that industry prot falls. If E < B, so that the entrant is the
smallest rm, part (ii) applies with minimum price p0 = (1  B   E)=A. If E denotes
21If an overlapping duopoly equilibrium did exist, part (ii) of Proposition 4 applies so rm 3 has no
captive customers and rms 1 and 2 price low. There would then be a threshold price p1 which is rm
2s highest price and rm 3s lowest price. Since rm 3 has no captive customers, its demand at p = p1
is 3(1  F1(p1)), and since it cannot be better o¤ with price p = p0, we require that 1  F1(p1)  p0=p1.
However, the fact that rm 2 is willing to choose p1 implies that 1 F1(p1) < p0=p1, which is a contraction.
22Unlike our main model with consideration sets, in the capacity framework our assumption of unit
demands makes a signicant di¤erence to and simplies the analysis. De Francesco and Salvadori
(2015) have studied triopoly in the richer and more complex situation where aggregate demand is downward
sloping under the assumption of an e¢ cient rationing rule, and show that additional possibilities can then
arise in equilibrium. For example, the smallest rm might have an atom at its maximum price, with the
result that the two larger rms do not choose prices immediately above this maximum price and there are
gaps in the set of prices o¤ered in the market.
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the entrants prot, the change in prot due to entry is
(A + B)p0 + E   (A + B)1  B
A
= E   E A + B
A
:
However, the entrant cannot make prot greater than E (which is its prot if it could
supply its capacity at price p = 1), and so the above change in prot is negative and
consumers benet from entry. Finally, if B < E < A, so the entrant is the middle rm,
then rm B also has no captive customers, and part (ii) applies with the same minimum
price p0 = (1  B   E)=A. The change in prot due to entry is now
(A + E)p0 + B   (A + B)1  B
A
 (A + E)p0 + B   (A + B)1  B
A
=
(1  A   B)(E   B)  2E
A
< 0 :
Here, the rst inequality follows since B  B, and the second inequality follows since
the entrant has no captive customers.
More generally, our main model with consideration sets allows for richer patterns of
competition interaction than the Bertrand-Edgeworth model. In the former framework,
entry can occur without reducing the number of captive customers, a rm can have di¤erent
overlapwith similarly-sized rivals, and a small rm can have a high proportion of its
reach captive, none of which are possible in the capacity framework.
6 Conclusions
The aim of this paper has been to explore, in a parsimonious framework with price-setting
rms and homogeneous products, how patterns of consumer consideration matter for com-
petitive outcomes, in particular the nature of price dispersion in mixed-strategy equilibria.
The analysis has yielded a number of results that we did not initially expect. First, whereas
in existing models all rms are direct competitors over a range of prices, we found equilibria
with segmented pricing patterns, i.e., with some rms only pricing high and others only
pricing low.
Second, in the three-rm case we established generically either that all rms set the
same minimum price (in which case their prot was proportional to reach), or that pricing
was segmented (so that one rm only set low prices and one set only high prices). In prior
literature multiplicity of equilibria has gained considerable attention, and all such cases lie
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on the knife edge between these two regimes. Third, the key to determining which of the
two regimes applies was found to be the proximity or otherwise of the pairwise correlation
measures of competitive interaction, ij, and when one pair of rms had signicantly greater
competitive interaction than other pairs then segmented pricing ensued. Fourth, for some
parameter congurations we found equilibria with a gap in one rms price support, so
that that rm sometimes prices high, and sometimes low, but never in between.
Fifth, we found plausible patterns of consumer consideration in which entry is detri-
mental to consumers because it softens competition between incumbents, leading them to
retreat to exploit their captive consumers. Likewise, there were situations where an increase
in the number of consumers who consider one pair of rms causes a third rm to retreat
towards its captive base, showing that search externalities need not benet all consumers.
Sixth, our model of competition with consumer consideration sets can di¤er radically from
the familiar Bertrand-Edgeworth model of competition with capacity constraints. Indeed
in the three-rm case the latter can be interpreted as consideration set model in which
a negative proportion of consumers consider all of the rms. This di¤erence implies that
overlapping duopoly pricing is not a feature of the Bertrand-Edgeworth model.
The analysis could be extended in two broad directions. One would be to settings
beyond nested reach and the three-rm case that we have analysed in detail. For example,
one could seek more general conditions for equilibrium to take the overlapping duopoly
form, or one could try to establish that all rms use the same minimum price when pairwise
competitive interactions are similar enough. The other approach would be to endogenise
the pattern of consideration sets, beyond our analysis of entry and mergers, by introducing
search by consumers and/or advertising by rms.23 For instance, one could study a model
of non-sequential search where a consumer can choose her consideration set S rms by
incurring a specied up-front search cost (increasing in S). Such a framework would
generalize Burdett and Judd (1983, section 3.2) to allow rms to be asymmetric and for
consumers to target specic rms for consideration.
23For instance, in the context of advertising, Ireland (1993) and McAfee (1994) study a sequential model
where rms rst invest in reach and then compete in price, while Butters (1977) studies the situation where
rms choose their reach and price simultaneously. (In each case reach is assumed to be independent.)
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Technical Appendix
Sketch proof of Lemma 1: We rst discuss arguments to do with deletion of dominated
prices. In any equilibrium we have i  i, since rm i can ensure at least this prot by
choosing price equal to 1 and serving its captive customers. For this reason, no rm would
ever o¤er a price below i, its captive-to-reach ratio, since if it did so it would obtain prot
below i even if it supplied its entire reach.
To see that every rm makes positive prot we invoke Assumption 2. There is at least
one rm i which has captive customers, and which will not set price below i > 0. (Clearly
this rm makes positive prot.) From the remaining rms, at least one rm j has captive
customers in the subset of rms excluding i, and so this rm can set price i and be sure
to obtain positive prot. Firm j therefore also has a positive lower bound on its prices.
Following the same argument, a rm in the subset of rms excluding both i and j can
obtain positive prot, and so on until the set of rms is exhausted. In particular, each
rms minimum price is strictly above zero and hence so is p0. This proves part (ii).
If price p < 1 is in rm is support then qi() in (1) cannot be at for prices just above
p, for otherwise the rm would obtain strictly greater prot by raising its price above
p. This implies that this price must be in the support of at least one other rm. More
precisely, if price p < 1 is in rm is support it must be in the support of at least one of
its potential competitors, where in a given equilibrium we say that rm j is a potential
competitorfor rm i at price p if rm is expected demand falls when j slightly undercuts
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i at price p given the equilibrium strategies followed by rms other than i and j. (This
then implies that i is a potential competitor for j.) If for all duopoly segments we have
ij > 0, then every rm is a potential competitor for every other rm. However, two
rms might have disjoint reaches, and so cannot be potential competitors. More generally,
the overlap between i and j might be contained within a third rms reach, and if in the
equilibrium the third rm always chooses price below p, then i and j do not compete at
price p. If price p in rm is support was not in the support of at least one of its potential
competitors, rm is demand would be at (and positive) in this neighbourhood of p, which
is not compatible with p maximizing the rms prot.
We next turn to arguments concerning the possibility of atoms in the price distri-
butions. First observe that two rms cannot both have an atom at price p if they are
potential competitors at this price (for otherwise each would have an incentive to undercut
the price p and gain a discrete jump in demand).
To see that each rms price distribution is continuous in the interval [p0; 1), suppose
by contrast that rm i has an atom at some price 0 < p < 1 in its support. We claim that
rms i demand in (1) must then be locally at above p. As noted above, there cannot be
a potential competitor to i at price p which also has an atom at p, and so qi does not jump
down discretely at p. In addition, any potential competitor to i at p obtains a discrete
increase in demand if it slightly undercuts p, and so such a rm would never choose a price
immediately above p. Since no potential competitor chooses a price immediately above p,
rm i loses no demand if it raises its price slightly above p, which is not compatible with
p maximizing the rms prot. Therefore, rm i cannot have an atom below 1, and this
completes the proof of part (iii). This implies that each rms demand (1) is continuous
in the interval [p0; 1).
Similarly, if p0 is the minimum price ever chosen in the market, then all prices in the
interval [p0; 1] are sometimes chosen. If p is in rm is support but no rm is active in an
interval (p; p0) above p, then rm i has at demand over the range (p; p0), and this cannot
occur in equilibrium. This completes the proof of part (iv).
Suppose now that there are at least three rms. Let Pij denote the set of prices in
[p0; 1] which are in the supports of both rm i and rm j, which is a closed set. Part (iv)
implies that the collection fPijg covers the interval [p0; 1], and since each rm participates,
at least two of the sets in fPijg are non-empty. If there were no price in the support of
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three or more rms then the collection fPijg would consist of disjoint sets. However, since
[p0; 1] is connected it cannot be covered by two or more disjoint closed sets, and we deduce
that at least two sets in fPijg must overlap, which proves part (v).
Firms can have an atom at the reservation price p = 1. However, as noted above, if
rm i has an atom at p = 1 then no potential competitor can also have an atom at 1,
which implies that when rm i chooses p = 1 it sells only to its captive customers and so
its prot is precisely i = i. If no rm has an atom at p = 1 then any rm with p = 1
in its support (and there must be at two such rms from part (iv)) has prot equal to i.
This completes the proof for part (i).
Let rm j be a rm which obtains prot equal to j. Then the minimum price ever
chosen, p0, must be no higher than j (for otherwise rm j could obtain more prot by
choosing p = p0), and so p0 cannot exceed the highest i. Since no rm sets a price below
its i, the minimum price p0 (which from part (iv) is sometimes chosen by at least two
rms) must be weakly above the second lowest i. Finally, if the rm with the highest i
has p0 in its support, then p0 cannot be strictly lower than this highest i, and so must
equal this highest i. This completes the proof for part (vi).
Proof of Proposition 1: We construct an equilibrium of the stated form. The prot of the
largest rm n is n = n, its number of captive customers, and denote the prot of smaller
rms by i. In the highest interval [pn 1; 1] used by the two largest rms, these rms are
sure to be undercut by all smaller rivals, and so in this price range their CDFs must satisfy
n + n 1(1  Fn 1(p)) =
n
p
; n 1(1  Fn(p)) =
n 1
p
:
Since Fn(pn 1) = 0 it follows that pn 1 and n 1 are related as
n 1 = n 1pn 1 :
We have Fn 1(1) = 1, while the largest rm has an atom at p = 1 with probability
1  Fn(1) = n 1=n 1 = pn 1.
In the lowest interval [p1; p2] used by the two smallest rms, these rms are sure to
undercut all larger rivals, and so in this range their CDFs must satisfy
2 + 1(1  F1(p)) =
2
p
; 1(1  F2(p)) = 1
p
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and since F1(p1) = F2(p1) = 0 it follows that
1 = 1p1 ; 2 = (1 + 2)p1 :
Since F1(p2) = 1 we have 2 = 2p2, which combined with the previous expression for 2
implies that
p2 =
1 + 2
2
p1 : (22)
If there are just three rms, these are the two price intervals in the equilibrium. With
more than three rms there are intermediate intervals, and in the interval [pi; pi+1], where
1 < i < n   1, rms i and i + 1 are active and will be undercut by smaller rivals and
undercut their larger rivals. Therefore, in this range their CDFs must satisfy
i+1 + i(1  Fi(p)) =
i+1
p
; i(1  Fi+1(p)) =
i
p
: (23)
Since Fi+1(pi) = 0 it follows that
i = ipi :
An intermediate rm i, where 2  i  n   1, is active in both the intervals [pi 1; pi]
and [pi; pi+1], and its CDF Fi needs to be continuous across the threshold price pi. At the
price pi we therefore require that
i 1
i 1pi
= 1  Fi(pi) = 1
i

i+1
pi
  i+1

; (24)
where in the case of i = 2 we have written 1 = 1. If we write pn = 1 then we have
i = ipi for all rms 1  i  n, and so for 2  i  n 1 expression (24) entails expression
(8). This is a second-order di¤erence equation in pi where p1 is free, p2 is given in (22),
and the terminal condition pn = 1 serves to pin down p1. It is clear from (22) and (8) that
the sequence p1; p2; p3; ::: is an increasing sequence of price thresholds. This completes the
description of the candidate equilibrium.
We next show that no rm has an incentive to deviate from its described strategy. By
construction, rm i is indi¤erent between choosing any price in the interval [pi 1; pi+1],
assuming its rivals follow the stated strategies. We need to check that a rms prot is no
higher if it chooses a price outside this interval. Consider rst an upward price deviation,
which is only relevant if i < n  1. If i < n  2 and rm i chooses a price above pi+2 is has
no demand since rm i+ 1 is sure to set a lower price and all rm is potential customers
also consider rm (i + 1)s price. Suppose then that i < n   1 and rm i chooses a price
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p 2 [pi+1; pi+2], in which case it has demand i if its price is below the prices of both rivals
i+ 1 and i+ 2. Therefore, from (23) its prot with such a price is
pi[1  Fi+1(p)][1  Fi+2(p)] =
ii+1
2i+1

i+2
p
  i+2

= pi+1
ii+2
i+1

pi+2
p
  1

:
This prot decreases from i = ipi at p = pi+1 to zero at p = pi+2. We deduce that rm
i cannot increase its prot by choosing a price above pi+1.
Next consider a downward price deviation, so that rm i chooses a price below pi 1
(which is only relevant when i > 2). Suppose that this rm chooses a price in the interval
[pj; pj+1], where j  i  2. The rm will undercut all rms larger than rm j + 1, and so
obtain demand at least j+2 + ::: + i. It will also serve the segment j+1 if it undercuts
rm j + 1 and it will additionally serve the segment j if it undercuts both rms j and
j + 1. Putting this together implies that the rms prot with price p 2 [pj; pj+1] is
p

j+2 + :::+ i + (1  Fj+1(p))(j+1 + j(1  Fj(p))
	
: (25)
Given the CDFs in (23), this prot is a convex function of p and so must be maximized in
this range either at pj or at pj+1. Therefore, we can restrict our attention to deviations by
rm i > 2 to the threshold prices fp1; p2; :::; pi 2g. If it chooses price pj where 2  j  i 2,
expression (25) implies its prot is
pj

j+1 + :::+ i + j(1  Fj(pj))
	
:
Expression (24) implies that j(1   Fj(pj)) is equal to j+1(pj+1pj   1), in which case the
above deviation prot with price pj is
pj

j+1 + :::+ i + j+1(
pj+1
pj
  1)

= j+1pj+1 + (j+2 + :::+ i)pj : (26)
One can check that expression (26) holds also for j = 1. We need to show that (26) is no
higher than rm is equilibrium prot, which is i = ipi. We do this in two steps: (i) we
show that (26) is increasing in j given i, so that j = i   2 is the most tempting of these
deviations for rm i, and (ii) we show (26) is below ipi when j = i  2.
To show (i), suppose that i  4, which is the only relevant case, and suppose that
1  j  i  3. Then rm is deviation prot with price pj+1 from (26) is
j+2pj+2 + (j+3 + :::+ i)pj+1 = j+1pj + j+2pj+1 + (j+3 + :::+ i)pj+1
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 j+1pj + j+2pj+1 + (j+3 + :::+ i)pj+1   (j+2   j+1)(pj+1   pj)
= j+1pj+1 + j+2pj + (j+3 + :::+ i)pj+1  j+1pj+1 + (j+2 + :::+ i)pj
where the nal expression is the rms deviation prot with price pj, which proves claim
(i). (Here, the rst equality follows from (8), the rst inequality follows from (7) and the
fact that fpjg is an increasing sequence, while the nal inequality follows from fpjg being
an increasing sequence.)
To show claim (ii), suppose that i  3 which is the only relevant case, and observe that
ipi = i 1pi 2 + ipi 1
 i 1pi 2 + ipi 1   (i   i 1)(pi 1   pi 2)
= i 1pi 1 + ipi 2
where the nal expression is (26) when j = i  2. (Here, the rst equality follows from (8)
and the inequality follows from fig being an increasing sequence.) This completes the
proof that the stated strategies constitute an equilibrium.
Proof of Proposition 2: Lemma 1 shows that in any equilibrium each price in the range
[p0; 1] is chosen by at least two rms, where p0 denotes the minimum price o¤ered by any
rm in the equilibrium. In particular, either two or all three rms have p0 in their supports.
The lemma also shows that there is at least one price in all three price supports. Let L and
H denote respectively the lowest and highest price among the prices in all three supports.
(The set of prices in all three supports is closed.)
(i) Suppose that an equilibrium has L > p0, so that only two rms, say rms i and j,
o¤er the minimum price p0. These rms obtain prot i = ip0 and j = jp0 and in the
interval [p0; L] where Gk(p) = 0 expression (10) implies
ijGj(p) = ijGi(p) = 1 
p0
p
: (27)
This implies that Gi  Gj in this interval and let  = Gi(L) = Gj(L) > 0.
Firm k weakly prefers price L to price p0, and so (10) implies
kp0  kL[1  ikGi(L)  jkGj(L) + Gi(L)Gj(L)] : (28)
(Here, the left-hand side is its prot if it chooses p0, when it will serve its entire reach,
while the right-hand side is its prot with the higher price.) This inequality can be written
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as
ik + jk   2  1 
p0
L
= ij
where the equality follows from (27). We can divide by  > 0 to obtain
ij  ik + jk    : (29)
Since  = Gi(L)  i and  = Gj(L)  j, the term  is weakly below both ik and jk.
Expression (29) therefore implies that ij is weakly greater than both ik and jk, and so
using the stated labelling for rms we have k = 1 and the two low-price rms are rms 2
and 3. Since   minf2; 3g, expression (29) then implies
23  12 + 13     12 + 13   minf2; 3g : (30)
Therefore, if (11) holds the equilibrium cannot take the form where L > p0, and the only
alternative is that all three rms use the same minimum price p0. Lemma 1 (vi) shows
that this minimum price must then be the highest captive-to-reach ratio.
(ii) If condition (12) holds we will show that L = H so there is only one price in all three
supports. Either all three rms have the same minimum price p0 or only two rms do, and
in the latter case the proof for part (i) shows that it must be rms 2 and 3 which price low.
In either case rms 2 and 3 use p0, and in either case we have G2(L) = G3(L) =   0.
Suppose by contradiction that in equilibrium we have H > L. Let i and j label rms
2 and 3 such that Gi(H)  Gj(H). Then since we cannot have only rm 1 active in
the open interval (L;H), one or both of 2 and 3 must choose prices in (L;H), and so
 = Gi(L) < Gi(H)  g.
Firms 2 and 3 obtain respective prots p02 and p03, and let 1 denote rm 1s prot.
Expression (10) shows that a price p in rm 1s support satises
1 = 1p[1  12G2(p)  13G3(p) + G2(p)G3(p)] ;
and setting p = L;H in the above and subtracting implies that
1
1

1
L
  1
H

= 12G2(H) + 13G3(H)  G2(H)G3(H)
 12G2(L)  13G3(L) + G2(L)G3(L)
 12g + 13g   g2   12   13 + 2
= (g   )(12 + 13   (g + )) : (31)
37
Here, the inequality follows since 12  G3(H) and 13  G2(H), and so the initial
expression is weakly increased if we replace Gj(H) by g = Gi(H)  Gj(H). Likewise, and
using that fact that G1(L) = 0, for rm j we have
p0

1
L
  1
H

= 23Gi(H) + 1jG1(H)  G1(H)Gi(H)  23Gi(L)
= 23g + 1jG1(H)  gG1(H)  23
 23(g   ) :
Since 1  1p0 (as rm 1 weakly prefers any price in its support to p0) and g    > 0, it
follows that
23  12 + 13   (g + ) : (32)
If  = 0 (so no consumers consider all three rms) this inequality contradicts (12), so
we deduce that it is not possible to have H > L when (12) holds and  = 0. Therefore,
suppose henceforth that  > 0. Then since g > 0 the inequality (32) contradicts the rst
inequality in (30) which holds whenever L > p0. We deduce that if H > L then all three
rms must have the same minimum price p0 and hence  = 0.
We show next that if all three rms have the same minimum price, then (12) cannot
hold. First suppose that H < 1, so that only two rms are active in the upper range
(H; 1]. If rm 1 uses p = 1, then one of rms 2 or 3 has its maximum price at H, so that
G2(H) = 2 or G3(H) = 3. Therefore g = Gi(H)  minf2; 3g, in which case (32) is
inconsistent with (12).
Continue with the assumption that H < 1, but now suppose it is rms 2 and 3 which
are active above H, so that G1(H) = 1. Since all three rms have prot equal to p0
multiplied by their reach, (10) implies that for rm 1 and rm j we have respectively
p0 = H [1  12G2(H)  13G3(H) + G2(H)G3(H)]
p0 = H

1  1j1   23Gi(H) + 1Gi(H)

;
and combining these yields
(23   1i)Gi(H) = (1j   Gi(H))(Gj(H)  1) : (33)
However, condition (12) implies 23 > maxf12; 13g, and since Gi(H) > 0 it follows that
the right-hand side above is strictly positive, and in particular we have
1 < minfG2(H); G3(H)g : (34)
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Since rms 2 and 3 both use p = H and p = 1, while G1(H) = 1, for each k = 2; 3 we
have
p0

1
H
  1

= (23   1)(Gk(1) Gk(H)) : (35)
Write   G2(1) G2(H) = G3(1) G3(H) > 0. Note (35) implies that 23 > 1 so that
23 > 0 and there are some consumers who consider rms 2 and 3. As such, at most one
of these rms can have an atom at p = 1. Since rm 1 weakly prefers p = H to p = 1, we
have
p0

1
H
  1

 12G2(1) + 13G3(1)  G2(1)G3(1)
 12G2(H) + 13G3(H)  G2(H)G3(H)
=  [12 + 13   (G2(H) +G3(H) + )] :
Since  > 0, combining this inequality with (35) implies
23   1  12 + 13   (G2(H) +G3(H) + ) ;
or
minf2; 3g  12 + 13   23   (G2(H) +G3(H) +    1  minf2; 3g) : (36)
At most one of rms 2 and 3 has at atom at p = 1, so suppose that rm k 2 f2; 3g has no
atom, so that
Gk(H) +  = Gk(1) = k  minf2; 3g :
Combining this inequality with (34) and (36) then contradicts condition (12).
The nal case to consider is when H = 1, so that all three rms use the highest price.
If at most one of rms 2 and 3 has an atom at p = 1 then either G2(1) = 2 or G3(1) = 3
(or both). Therefore g  minf2; 3g, in which case (32) is inconsistent with (12). If both
rms 2 and 3 have an atom at p = 1 then we must have 23 = 0 otherwise the rms have
an incentive to undercut one another at p = 1. It follows that 1 = 23, in which case
(12) implies
(1 + minf2; 3g) > 12 + 13  (2 + 3)
and so 1 > maxf2; 3g. Since not all consumers are captive, when rms 2 and 3 each
have an atom at p = 1, rm 1 cannot do so and G1(1) = 1. Then the argument leading
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to the previous expression (34) applies, with H = 1, which contradicts our nding that
1 > maxf2; 3g.
In sum, we have shown that when (12) holds, there is only one price in the support
of all three rms, say p1. In particular, only two rms o¤er the minimum price p0, and
these are rms 2 and 3. Clearly p0 < p1 and only rms 2 and 3 are active in the range
[p0; p1). If p1 = 1 then the proof is complete. If p1 < 1 then there is no price in (p1; 1] in
the support of all rms, and so only two rms are active in this range, one of which must
be rm 1. The remaining issue is which of rms 2 and 3 is the other rm active above p1.
Suppose henceforth that rms 2 and 3 are labelled so 2  3. Expression (27) implies
that 2F2(p) = 3F3(p) in the range [p0; p1]. If 2 = 3 then F2 = F3, and so one of these
rms cannot drop out before the other and we must have p1 = 1. If 2 > 3 then in the
range [p0; p1] we have F3 > F2 and so it is rm 3 which drops out rst.
The nal step in the proof is to determine the prots of the three rms, as well as the
price thresholds p0 and p1. Since rms 2 and 3 have p0 as their minimum price in this
equilibrium, their prots are 2 = 2p0 and 3 = 3p0. In the range [p0; p1] their CDFs
are given by (27), and rm 3 drops out at price p1, so that the ratio p0=p1 satises
233 = 1 
p0
p1
: (37)
Expression (27) then implies that
G2(p1) = 3 : (38)
Either rm 1 or 2 (or both) obtains exactly its captive prot.24 Suppose rst that rm
1 obtains its captive prot, so that 1 = 1. For prices in the upper range [p1; 1] rms 1
and 2 compete and are sure to be undercut by rm 3, so from (10) rm 2s CDF satises
1  12G2   133 + 3G2 =
1
p
;
where recall that 1 is rm 1s captive-to-reach ratio. In order for G2() to be continuous
at the threshold price p1, (38) implies that
1  123   133 + 23 =
1
p1
;
24If one of these rms has no atom at p = 1 then the other obtains its captive prot when it chooses
p = 1. If both have an atom at p = 1 then for neither to have an incentive to undercut the other we must
have 12 = 0, in which case both rms obtain their captive prot at p = 1.
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which determines p1. Expression (37) in turn implies that
p0 = p1(1  233) =
1(1  233)
1  123   133 + 23
: (39)
It is convenient to write P for the right-hand side above, so that
P =
1(1  233)
1  123   133 + 23
=
1(2 + 12)
12 + 12(2   3) ; (40)
where the second equality follows by routine manipulation. Note from the rst expression
for P above that the condition P > 1 is equivalent to (11), and P < 1 corresponds
to (12). Note also that P  (2 + 12)=2, and so a su¢ cient condition for overlapping
duopoly to be the equilibrium is that
2 + 12
2
< 1 :
In words, this condition states that the higher captive-to-reach ratio in the duopoly market
with just rms 2 and 3 present is below rm 1s captive-to-reach ratio in the triopoly
market. Expression (39) implies
p1 =
12
12 + 12(2   3) : (41)
Alternatively, suppose rm 2 obtains its captive prot, so that 2 = 2. Since the rm
has p0 as its lowest price it follows that
p0 = 2 : (42)
Expression (37) then implies that
p1 =
2
2 + 12
: (43)
For prices in the upper range [p1; 1] rm 2s CDF now satises
1  12G2   133 + 3G2 =
1
1p
;
where 1 is rm 1s prot (to be determined). For G2 to be continuous at p = p1 =
2=(2 + 12), (38) implies that
1  123   133 + 23 =
2 + 12
2
 1
1
;
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which determines 1. This can be expressed as
1 =
12
P
(44)
where P is given in (40).
We next determine when it is that rm 1 or rm 2 obtains its captive prot. When
rm 1 obtains its captive prot, rm 2s minimum price is P in (40), which must be no
lower than 2 if rm 2 is willing to o¤er this price. Therefore, if P < 2 the equilibrium
must instead have rm 2 obtaining its captive prot, in which case the threshold prices
and rm 1s prot are given respectively by (42), (43) and (44). Conversely, when rm 2
obtains its captive prot, rm 1s prot is given in (44). This prot cannot be below its
captive prot 1, which therefore requires P  2. Therefore, if P > 2 the equilibrium
must involve rm 1 obtaining its captive prot, so 1 = 1, and the threshold prices are
given respectively by (40) and (41). Finally, in the knife-edge case where P = 2 the two
equilibria coincide, and rms 1 and 2 each obtain their captive prot. This completes the
proof.
Proof of Proposition 3: Part (i) is just an instance of Proposition 1 specialized to triopoly.
Now suppose 3 < 2, in which case part (i) of Proposition 2 shows that all rms choose
the same lowest price P0 = 3=3 and each rms prot is i = iP0. In general (not just
in the nested case), with demand in (10) the equilibrium condition pqi(p)  iP0 for a
price in rm is support can be written in factorized form
[ij   Gk(p)][ik   Gj(p)] = zi(p) (45)
where zi is given by
zi(p)  ijik   

1  P0
p

: (46)
Expression (45) implies that for a price in the support of all three rms the function
[jk   Gi(p)]zi(p) is the same for each rm i, and so rm is CDF is given by
[jk   Gi(p)]2 =
zj(p)zk(p)
zi(p)
: (47)
Specializing to the nested case, where
z1 = z2 =
P0
23
1
p
; z3 =
P0
23

1
p
  1

;
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the expressions (47) simplify to

1  1
2
F1
2
= (1  F2)2 = 3
2

1
p
  1

(48)
(1  F3)2 = 23
23p(1  p)
: (49)
Here, F1 and F2 increase with p, while F3 is hump-shaped and increases only in the
range p  1=2. Since CDFs cannot decrease, it follows that any interval of prices (rather
than merely a single point) where all rms are active must be contained in the range
p  1=2. In particular, we must have P0 < 1=2, which is indeed implied by the assumption
3 < 2. One can check that F1  F2  F3 (where the second inequality requires p  P0),
so that F1 will be the rst CDF to reach Fi = 1. It will hit this constraint at price p1 in
(15).
If this price p1 is no higher than 1=2, i.e., if
3
2
 2
2
; (50)
which is a stronger condition than 2  3, then the equilibrium involves all three rm
active in the range [p0; p1], and then only the two larger rms are active in the range (p1; 1].
For prices above p1, where rm 1 is sure to serve its reach, the CDFs for the two larger
rms satisfy
1  F2 = 3
2

1
p
  1

; 1  F3 = 23
32p
(51)
The only condition to check is that rm 1 has no incentive to choose a price above p1.
However, when its rivals use the CDFs in (51), one can check that rm 1s prot with price
p > p1 is lower than its prot with price p1, and so this deviation is not protable. This
proves part (iii).
The remaining parameter region is when
2
2
<
3
2
< 1 : (52)
In this case the candidate for the CDF F3 in (49) begins to decrease in p before F1 reaches
1. Here, an equilibrium can be constructed by rst deriving F3 as in part (iii), ignoring
the constraint that it needs to be increasing, and then ironing the result to eliminate
the hump. To illustrate, consider the example where 1 = 5, 2 = 3 and 3 = 2. Then
P0 = 1=5, in (15) p1 = 16=25, and F3 as given in (49) and (51) is depicted as the solid
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curve on Figure 4 in the main text. The dashed line shows the ironing procedure, so that
F3 is attened to be no greater than the level F3(p1) = 1=6 for prices below p1. The smaller
root of F3 = 1=6 in (49) is p^ = 9=25. In this example, all three rms are active in the price
range [1
5
; 9
25
], only rms 1 and 2 are active in the interior range ( 9
25
; 16
25
), and then only rms
2 and 3 are active in the range (16
25
; 1). In the interior range ( 9
25
; 16
25
), the other CDFs F1
and F2 also need modifying from (48) to reect that they will be undercut by rm 3 with
the constant probability F3(p1) = 1=6 in this range (in which case they have no demand),
so that their CDFs satisfy
5
6
(3 + 5(1  F1)) = 16
10p
;
5
6
(1  F2) = 1
5p
:
With these CDFs, one can check that rm 1 does not gain by choosing a price in this
interior range. As before, rm 1 has no incentive to choose a price above p1 = 16=25, and
so this is indeed an equilibrium.
Exactly the same procedure is valid with any case in the parameter region (52). One
can check that F3 in (49) evaluated at price p1 in (15) is positive if and only if 2 > 3.
From (49) it is clear that other price p^ which yields the same value for F3 as p1 is
p^ = 1  p1 = 
2
2
23 + 
2
2
;
which is below 1=2 given that p1 is above 1=2, and one can check that p^ > 3=3 as well.
Thus this equilibrium has all three rms active between 3=3 and p^, rms 1 and 2 are
active in the interior region between p^ and p1 (which is symmetric about p = 1=2), and
then rms 2 and 3 are active between p1 and 1. This completes the proof for part (ii).
Proof of Proposition 4: (i) The proof mirrors the corresponding proof in Proposition 2,
and the argument leading to expression (29) shows that if only two rms price low it is
necessary that
^ij  ^ik + ^jk   ^ : (53)
Since ^ < 0, it follows that if only two rms price low it must be the pair of rms with the
highest ^ij, i.e., rms 1 and 2. Expression (53) then implies
^12  ^13 + ^23   ^ > ^13 + ^23 = ^13 : (54)
(The nal equality follows since ^23 = 0.) Therefore, if ^12  ^13 the equilibrium cannot
take the form where only two rms price low, and the only alternative is that all three
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rms use the same minimum price p0. However, since ^12  ^13, the only way to have
^12  ^13 is ^12 = ^13 as stated.
(ii) Next suppose that all three rms have the same lowest price p0, so that i = ip0.
Prices just above p0 are therefore in each rms support, in which case expression (20)
implies that for prices just above p0 we have
^ijGj + ^ikGk   ^GjGk = 1 
p0
p
:
Since ^23 = 0, the conditions for rms 2 and 3 become
G1(^12   ^G3) = 1 
p0
p
= G1(^13   ^G2) :
Since G1(p) > 0 for p above p0, this requires that
^12   ^G3(p) = ^13   ^G2(p) :
However, since G2 and G3 are continuous and both equal zero when p = p0, this condition
requires ^12 = ^13. Therefore, if ^12 > ^13 the only possibility is for only two rms to price
low. From part (i), these two rms must be rms 1 and 2. We know from Lemma 1 (vi)
that p0 is therefore equal to rm 1s captive-to-reach ratio, which completes the proof.
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